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This symposium article critically evaluates the developing
Post-Shareholder-Value (PSV) paradigm in corporate governance
scholarship and practice with particular reference to Professor Colin
Mayer’s influential theory of the corporation as a unique, long-term
“commitment device.” The article’s positive claim is that, while evolving
PSV institutional mechanisms such as benefit corporations and dual-class
share structures are generally encouraging from a social perspective, there
is cause for skepticism about their capacity to become anything more than
a niche or peripheral feature of the U.S. public corporations landscape.
This is because such measures, despite their apparent reformist potential,
are still ultimately quasi-contractual and thus essentially voluntary in
nature, meaning that they are unlikely to be adopted in a public
corporations context except in extraordinary instances. This Article’s
normative claim is that, while in many respects the orthodox shareholderoriented corporate governance framework may be a social evil, it is
nonetheless a necessary evil, which U.S. worker–savers implicitly tolerate
as the effective social price for sustaining a system of nonoccupational
income provision outside of direct state control. Accordingly, pending
fundamental reform of the broader social-institutional context to the
shareholder-oriented corporation, the key features of the evolving PSV
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governance model should remain quasi-contractual as opposed to being
placed on any sort of mandatory regulatory footing.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars of the modern public corporation mutually agree that their
subject of study is a truly remarkable institution. Far less commonly
agreed upon, though, is precisely why this is so. Over the past four decades,
social-scientific analysis of business corporations—at least in the
English-speaking world—has been dominated in large part by reductionist
theories inspired by neoclassical economics, which essentially seek to
break the corporation (or “firm”) down to its component human parts.1
1. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of
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From this general viewpoint, the purported significance of the corporation
is typically perceived as residing in its capacity to enable corporate
participants (as notional “contractors”) to economize on the transaction
costs involved in both financing and organizing complex production
projects on a collective scale.2
Accordingly, various legal features of the corporation—including
limited liability,3 separate legal personality,4 and centralized board
management5—have on different occasions been lauded as its key
organizational characteristic. At the same time, debate over the rightful
distribution of decision-making influence within the corporate structure
has steadily burned on, whereby the relative advantages and disadvantages
of allocating legal governance powers to directors versus shareholders
have been variously chewed over.6 However, while the instrumental
question as to the most effective legal “means” of corporate governance
has been a topic of fervent disagreement, the corresponding issue of the
ultimate social “end” to which these efforts should be driving towards has,
until fairly recently, been a conspicuous point of acquiescence amongst
otherwise diametrically opposed observers.7
the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976).
2. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2008) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]; BRIAN R.
CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (1997); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) [hereinafter
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, CORPORATE LAW]; R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2d ed.) (2009); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
3. See generally F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89 (1989); P. Halpern, M. Trebilcock & S. Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited
Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980).
4. See generally Henry H. Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
5. See generally BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2; Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
547 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy].
6. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59
BUS. LAW. 43 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Power]; William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010); Jill E. Fisch,
The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435 (2012); M. Kahan & E. Rock,
The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347 (2011); Bernard S. Sharfman, Why Proxy
Access is Harmful to Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 387 (2012); L.A. Stout, The Mythical
Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789 (2007).
7. On the “means” versus “ends” dichotomy in corporate governance scholarship, see
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5.
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For the most part, despite their differences of opinion on other issues,
corporate law and governance scholars have tended to agree upon one
thing at least: the overarching normative objective of corporate
governance—and by implication, corporate law—should be the
maximization (or, at least, long-term enhancement) of shareholder
wealth.8 Indeed this proposition—variously referred to as the “shareholder
wealth maximization,”9 “shareholder value,”10 or (as will be used here11)
“shareholder primacy”12 norm—is so ingrained within mainstream
corporate governance thinking that it has rarely been subjected to serious
policy or even academic question, except for relatively moderate concerns
about the appropriateness of the time horizon over which shareholders’
collective financial welfare is most appropriately adjudged by managers
and boards.13
Although in the 1990s corporate governance scholars witnessed the
fairly widespread development of competing pluralist or “stakeholder”
8. See, e.g., Henry H. Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, End of History]; Stephen M.
Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge, SWM Norm]; M.C. Jensen, Value
Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, in 7 EUROPEAN FIN.
MGMT. 297 (2001) [hereinafter Jensen, Value Maximisation]; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, CORPORATE
LAW, supra note 2, at 35–39; Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 6, at 842–43; Bainbridge,
Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 574–92.
9. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255 (2015); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063 (2001); Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth
Maximization and its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389 (2014); Bainbridge,
SWM Norm, supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275 (2002) [hereinafter Bratton, Enron]; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors
in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1465 (2007); William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology
for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y. 13 (2000); Jensen, Value Maximisation, supra note 8.
11. For the purposes of this article, the term “shareholder primacy” is preferred because of the
present author’s view that it best encapsulates the essential functional outcome of the key legal
principles in this regard and, in particular, their effect in ensuring the systematic prioritization by
corporate management of the collective interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders (and
especially employees) in the event of conflict. See infra Part III.C.
12. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate
Governance, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531 (2003); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP.
L. 99 (2008); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1189 (2002); David Millon, Shareholder Primacy in the Classroom After the Financial Crisis,
8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 191 (2013).
13. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2005);
The Aspen Institute, Overcoming Short-termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach to
Investment and Business Management (September 2009); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the
Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 264 (2012); Marc T. Moore & Edward
Walker-Arnott, A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short-Termism, 41 J. LAW & SOC. 416 (2014).
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understandings of the corporation’s rightful social objectives,14 such
counter-theories rarely garnered much serious consideration within the
mainstream. And, where they have been picked up on beyond their own
periphery, it has more often than not been for the purpose of discrediting
the general stakeholder governance model due to its alleged practical
unworkability.15 Consequently, at the turn of the present century—and
notwithstanding the United States witnessing what was (at the time)
arguably the country’s most serious corporate governance failure in the
form of the Enron collapse—the shareholder primacy paradigm was for all
intents and purposes still alive and well.16 Moreover, federal regulatory
reforms implemented in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial
crisis—including mandatory shareholder “say on pay” voting17 and opt-in
proxy access18—were indicative of a policy agenda, which (somewhat
counterintuitively in many peoples’ eyes) saw intensification of directors’
focus on shareholder welfare as the most appropriate response to the
corporate governance and risk oversight lapses exposed in the then
recently failed banks.19
At long last, though, the zeitgeist would appear to be slowly but
surely changing. The financial crisis may not quite have proved the
14. See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995); John Kay, The Stakeholder Corporation, in
STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM 125 (Gavin Kelly et al. eds., 1997); Gavin Kelly & John Parkinson, The
Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist Approach, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
COMPANY 113 (John Parkinson et al. eds., 2000); Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 55
J. FIN. 1623 (2000).
15. See BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 66–67;
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 2, at 38; Jensen, Value Maximisation, supra
note 8, at 301.
16. Antoine Reberioux, Does Shareholder Primacy Lead to a Decline in Managerial
Accountability, 31 CAMB. J. ECON. 507, 507 (2007). In a legal-academic context, this is exemplified
most pertinently by Hansmann and Kraakman’s provocative End of History piece, supra note 8, which
was published in 2001—albeit shortly before the materialization of the abovementioned Enron
debacle. For arguments suggesting that the prevailing shareholder primacy (or “value”) norm in U.S.
corporate governance was the central factor underlying Enron’s collapse, see MICHEL AGLIETTA &
ANTOINE REBERIOUX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADRIFT: A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE
(2005), ch. 8; Simon Deakin and Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Learning from Enron, in 12 CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 134 (2004); Bratton, Enron, supra note 10.
17. See The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 951.
18. See The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, § 971;
MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 131–32 (2013)
[hereinafter MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
19. For a powerful argument to this effect, see Bratton & Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, supra note 6. Similarly, Bruner claims that the shareholder empowerment movement
“appears highly suspect in light of the growing postcrisis empirical literature, which tends to suggest
that strong emphasis on the interests of risk-preferring shareholders results in more risk-taking, not
less.” See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 271 (2013).
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watershed moment it was initially heralded as in terms of resetting
dominant currents of economic or political opinion. Nonetheless, in the
narrower but still important domain of corporate governance thinking and
policymaking, the past decade’s events have triggered the onset of what
promises to be a potentially major paradigm shift in the direction of an
evolving PSV consensus.20
In essence, the PSV thought consensus is an emerging body of
corporate governance scholarship that regards the orthodox U.S. corporate
objective of shareholder wealth (or value) maximization as being
inherently averse to the purportedly “true” purpose of the corporation as a
legal–institutional structure: that is, to protect the long-term productive
autonomy of a business organization and its capital base from the
destabilizing influence of short-term financial interests.21 The central
prescriptive tenets of this position are manifested on a practical policy
level by the proliferation of benefit corporations (and, relatedly, Certified
B Corporations), dual-class voting structures, anti-takeover mechanisms,
and other such legal mechanisms designed to afford enhanced insulation
to corporate boards and managers against unwanted external pressure from
activist shareholders and prospective control acquirers.22
On an academic level, this movement is represented by a growing
body of influential legal and economic scholarship—including, inter alia,
the work by Professor Colin Mayer, to which the Berle VIII Symposium
is partly dedicated23—which contests most of the staple ideological tenets
of orthodox corporate governance theory. In particular, proponents of the
PSV paradigm typically dismiss the common neoclassical equation of
shareholder wealth maximization with economic efficiency in the broader
social sense.24 They also typically eschew individualistic understandings
of the corporation (or “firm”) in terms of its purported internal bargaining
dynamics in favor of alternative conceptual models, which celebrate the

20. Although (at least to the author’s best knowledge) the term “post-shareholder-value” has not
been utilized within any U.S. or other English-language publication to date, it has previously been
used by Josef F.H. Baumüller in the title of his (German-language) management theory book POST
SHAREHOLDER VALUE: ZUKÜNFTIGE UNTERNEHMENSFÜHRUNGSKONZEPTE NACH DEM
SHAREHOLDER VALUE-KONZEPT (2010), the latter part of which translates as “Future Management
Concepts After the Shareholder Value Concept.”
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See generally COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US
AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013) [hereinafter MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT].
24. For a critical discussion of the commonly assumed correlation between shareholder wealth
maximization and economic efficiency generally, see Paddy Ireland, Defending the Rentier:
Corporate Theory and the Reprivatisation of the Public Company, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE COMPANY 161–63 (John Parkinson et al. eds., 2000).
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distinctive value of the corporation’s inherently autonomous corporeal
features.25
Of central importance to the PSV thought paradigm is the notion of
the corporate legal form as a structural mechanism for indefinitely
“locking in” capital so as to facilitate significant future advancements in
human progress and well-being. Therefore, the fundamental problem is
not the public corporation itself but rather the way in which this invaluable
vehicle of economic and social development has allegedly been
manipulated in the service of objectives that are averse to its fundamental
nature. From this perspective, shareholder primacy is presented as an
undesirable and, moreover, unnecessary social evil, which has the effect
of undermining (if not negating outright) the corporation’s core structural
attributes for the benefit of short-term financial interests and at the
corresponding expense of current and future humanity at large.26
It is submitted that evidence of a potential drift from the formerly
dominant shareholder primacy paradigm in corporate governance is
additionally apparent on a practical policymaking level today, not least in
the rapid proliferation of benefit corporations as a viable and popular
alternative legal form to the orthodox commercial corporation.27 At the
same time, the apparently increasing use by U.S.-listed firms of dual-class
voting structures designed to insulate management from “outside” capital
market pressures, coupled with the seemingly greater flexibility afforded
to boards over recent years in defending against unwanted takeover bids
from so-called corporate “raiders” both provide additional cause to
question the longevity of the shareholder-oriented corporate governance
status quo.28
Against the above background, this Article critically evaluates the
developing PSV paradigm in corporate governance scholarship and
practice with particular reference to Mayer’s influential theory of the
corporation as a unique, long-term “commitment device.”29 Part I of this
25. On these core aspects of the general PSV corporate governance thought paradigm, see infra
Part I.
26. On these issues, likewise see infra Part I.
27. A Benefit Corporation differs from an orthodox for-profit corporation principally because it
is expressly subject to the alternative corporate purpose of creating general public benefit even in
situations where effective managerial pursuit of this goal may come at the cost of reduced risk-adjusted
economic returns for shareholders. However, in contrast to a standard non-profit organization, a
Benefit Corporation is generally not subject to any specific charitable purpose and does not enjoy taxexempt status. It also typically retains certain commercial-corporate structural features including the
capacity to distribute profits to shareholders. This is subject to the practical proviso that a Benefit
Corporation’s management is likely to enjoy greater freedom to resist external capital market pressures
to distribute earnings than would ordinarily be the case with a for-profit corporation. For a more
detailed discussion of a Benefit Corporation’s distinctive legal features, see infra Part II.A.
28. On these issues, see infra Part II.
29. MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT, supra note 23, at 112.
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Article analyzes the key features of the PSV thought paradigm including
(but not limited to) Mayer’s “firm commitment” thesis. Part II examines
how the general PSV paradigm has manifested on a policy level today
within corporate governance practice, looking in particular at the
increasing demand for the B Corp30 and benefit corporation forms in the
United States over recent years and also the corresponding popularity of
managerial hostile takeover defenses and dual-class voting structures.
While evolving PSV institutional mechanisms such as benefit corporations
and dual-class share schemes are prima facie encouraging from a social
perspective, there is cause for skepticism about their capacity to become
anything more than a relatively niche or peripheral feature of the U.S.
public corporations landscape. This is principally because such measures,
despite their apparent reformist potential, are still ultimately quasicontractual, and thus essentially voluntary in nature, meaning that they are
unlikely to be adopted in a public corporations context except in
extraordinary instances.
Accordingly, Part III examines whether there is a plausible
normative justification for placing such measures on a firmer regulatory
footing as a means of more assertively implementing the PSV corporate
governance agenda in practice. It posits that such measures—irrespective
of the extent of their adoption over the coming years—ultimately should
remain quasi-contractual and voluntary in nature, as opposed to being
placed on any sort of mandatory basis. That is, at least pending
fundamental reform of the broader social-institutional context to the
orthodox shareholder-oriented corporation, and—in particular—the
United States’ predominantly private (i.e., non-statist) pensions
framework.
I. FIRM COMMITMENT AND THE POST-SHAREHOLDER-VALUE
THOUGHT PARADIGM
A. Mayer’s Firm Commitment Thesis
At the heart of the PSV intellectual movement sits the book which
was partly the subject of the Berle VIII Symposium, namely Colin
Mayer’s31 excellent work Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation Is
30. As will be explained further below, the essential difference between (i) a Benefit Corporation
and (ii) a B Corp is that whereas the former type of organization is formally established under
applicable (State) legislation, and thus requires specific public registration the latter is simply a
market-provided accreditation available to existing commercial corporations meeting certain
privately-formulated eligibility criteria, which in itself does not entail outright entity reconstitution.
For a more detailed explanation of the distinction between these dual phenomena, see infra Part I.A.
31. Colin Mayer is the Peter Moores Professor of Management Studies at Saïd Business School
at the University of Oxford. He is one of the world’s foremost thinkers on corporate governance and
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Failing Us and How to Restore Trust in It.32 Mayer’s 2013 monograph
represents a central and highly influential component of the developing
PSV thought consensus. In particular, it advances and develops an idea
that is pivotal to contemporary PSV ideology, which is the notion of the
corporation as a sophisticated, long-term “commitment device.”33
Essentially, this idea denotes the unique structural capacity of an
incorporated business entity to act as an effective, long-term store for
equity investors’ capital by ensuring that such funds—once committed to
the corporate enterprise—become permanent and thus unsusceptible to
future withdrawal by investors (or, by the same logic, their personal
creditors) on unilateral demand.34 Mayer claims that, theoretically, this
effective asset lock that the corporate legal form creates enables investors
to voluntarily restrain themselves ex ante from exercising control over the
firm’s capital reservoir in ways that are prone to harm the interests of
other, more vulnerable firm participants or interests.35 This especially
applies with respect to future situations where such harmful action might
actually prove to be in investors’ best interests at the relevant time, at least
in the short run.36
From a corporate governance point of view, the implication is that
management can consequently make credible long-term undertakings to
protect the continuing value of important nonfinancial investments
advanced by other firm participants, especially the human capital
committed to the corporation by its key employees. These undertakings
are, in turn, likely to engender reciprocal trust and loyalty within the firm’s
various stakeholder relations. Mayer places considerable emphasis on the
notion of “self-restraint” in general as a necessary precondition to
long-term human well-being37 and particularly as an essential means of
eliciting trust on the part of those who benefit from such restraint.38
According to this view, while self-restraint is averse to the pursuit of
immediate gratification, it is nonetheless justifiable in accordance with
one’s own (enlightened) self-interest. In particular, self-restraint is
finance, particularly with respect to the relationship between corporations and financial markets. His
book FIRM COMMITMENT (supra note 23) represents a key, although by no means exclusive, example
of his pioneering scholarship in this area. See also Colin Mayer, New Issues in Corporate Finance, 32
EUR. ECON. REV. 1167 (1988); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Hostile Takeovers and the Correction
of Managerial Failure, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1996); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Ownership and
Control of German Corporations, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 943 (2001).
32. MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT, supra note 23.
33. Id. at 112.
34. Id. at 145–46.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 124.
37. Id. at 20.
38. Id. at 145.
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purportedly motivated by the potential long-term benefits that are likely to
come from not encroaching on other parties’ interests.
It follows from the above perspective that the separation of
ownership and control within Anglo-American public corporations—far
from being a problem that merits a corresponding “solution” (as orthodox
scholarship typically avers)39—is contrarily a source of opportunity in
itself, insofar as it facilitates managerial responsiveness to important third
party interests, which are typically not protected contractually.40 Mayer
posits that “[i]n an exact reversal of the problem suggested by Berle and
Means of dispersed shareholders, from the perspective of firm
commitment, the separation of ownership and control is a benefit, not a
cost.”41 This is because “[b]y separating ownership and control of the
corporation, shareholders are able to delegate authority to directors who
can make commitments to other parties that shareholders would like but
are unable credibly to provide themselves.”42
To this end, Mayer supports the notion of: (i) control and (ii) liquidity
as being mutually substitutable attributes, whereby investors acquire the
capacity readily to convert their shareholdings into cash at any time on the
(external) secondary capital market in exchange for surrendering influence
over aspects of (internal) business policy.43 Thus, Mayer would appear to
regard a more or less complete bifurcation of liquidity and control as a
positive governance feature, at least for some public corporations.44 Mayer
claims that this bifurcation enables management to make credible longterm commitments to nonshareholder groups, which would be otherwise
impossible if shareholders were in a position to pressurize for the unilateral
revocation of those undertakings in the future.45
However, according to Mayer, the credibility of investors’ capital
commitments is seriously undermined by capital market institutions that
enable shareholders collectively to lobby for withdrawal of their invested
funds from the firm on demand. This in turn undermines the ensuing
degree of stakeholder trust likely to be placed in the firm and its
management, thereby eroding the commitment-facilitating value of the
corporate form in practice.46 Specifically, Mayer claims that hostile
39. For a critical analysis of this general feature of orthodox corporate governance scholarship,
see Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, Revitalizing the Institutional Roots of Anglo-American
Corporate Governance, 40 ECON. & SOC’Y 84 (2011).
40. MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT, supra note 23, at 6.
41. Id. at 147.
42. Id. at 153.
43. See id. at 145–50.
44. Id. at 147.
45. See id. at 210–12.
46. Id. at 139.
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takeovers motivated by the apparent objective of “unlocking shareholder
value” enables prospective control-acquirers to offer a bid premium
directly to shareholders irrespective of management support.47 Such
transactions consequently provide a unique opportunity for a prospective
corporate acquirer (or “raider”) to wrest control over the firm’s internal
capital reserves from its incumbent management, which facilitates the
effective withdrawal of these reserves at any given time in the future.48
The overall effect is to make it impossible for investors to make any sort
of credible precommitment of their capital to the firm on a permanent or
even long-term basis, given the potential opportunity that they may have
collectively participated in the effective withdrawal of these funds in
future.49 This serves to undermine significantly the firm’s role as a longterm commitment device in the above sense.50
Furthermore, Mayer argues that in the presence of an active market
for corporate control, managers of public corporations are consequently
pressurized to distribute high levels of capital to shareholders rather than
retain these reserves for purposes of internal enterprise stability and
expansion.51 In this way, managers in effect preclude potential future
attempts to “unlock” these reserves either via an outright control bid, or
else by means of activist investor interventions geared to acquiring
significant minority shareholder influence.52 Moreover, in Mayer’s view,
hedge funds and other especially activist shareholders, by pressurizing
management to return greater amounts of cash to shareholders in the form
of dividends or (as is more customary) stock buybacks, undermine the
corporation’s capacity to make credible commitments to other
stakeholders.53 This is because depletion of the firm’s internal capital
reserves creates a greater likelihood of future business financing shortfalls
necessitating resort to external capital markets, thereby rendering
management subservient to shareholders’ (in priority to other
stakeholders’) collective demands on an ongoing basis.54 Accordingly,
Mayer supports the ready availability of legal institutional mechanisms
that are designed to offset or even negate such capital market pressures in
appropriate instances.55

47. Id. at 146.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 154.
51. See id. at 175, 243.
52. See id. at 146–48.
53. Id. at 185–86.
54. Id. at 174–75.
55. Specific examples of such will be discussed in Part II.C below.
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As a conceptual critique of prevailing Anglo-American corporate
governance norms, Mayer’s thesis is both distinctive and compelling.
Arguably, the most remarkable feature of Mayer’s argument is his view
that, in terms of tackling the dilemma of how to engender enhanced firm
commitment, the corporate form is the solution rather than the underlying
problem itself.56 In other words, the proper remedial approach is not that
of reforming the basic structure of the public corporation itself (which
remains fundamentally sound and sensible), but rather in seeking to ensure
that its core structural qualities are better protected against outside
encroachment from destructive capital market influences.57 From a
normative standpoint, this is a highly convincing claim with which the
present author has much sympathy. However, whether Mayer’s key
prescriptive assertions are capable of being effectively implemented in
practice, at least without themselves occasioning adverse collateral social
impacts, is a more contestable point that will be analyzed later in this
Article.58
B. The Broader Post-Shareholder-Value Thought Paradigm
The central focus of Mayer’s work on the theoretical (if not actual)
autonomy of the corporate form from extraneous investor interference
resonates with a similar current of opinion developing within
contemporary legal scholarship, which likewise seeks to highlight the
value of the corporation’s inherent structural neutrality vis-à-vis
extraneous capital market interests. The intellectual precursor to this
evolving thought consensus was Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s
now-classic 1999 exposition of the corporation as a so-called “team
production” device.59 Blair and Stout’s influential theory of the firm
56. In this regard, Mayer asserts that: “[c]orporations are commitment devices . . . [and] achieve
this by making the capital that their owners invest in them permanent.” MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT,
supra note 23, at 145.
57. Indeed, Mayer qualifies his general exaltation of the corporate form’s commitmentfacilitating capacity with the significant proviso that: “[a]t least that in principle is how [corporations]
create commitment … [but that t]he permanent capital of the firm is no longer permanent [insofar as]
it can be extracted in acquisitions that are paid for by cash.” Id. at 146.
58. See infra Parts II and III.
59. Margaret Blair is the Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise at Vanderbilt Law
School and a foremost economic thinker within the overlapping fields of corporate law, governance,
and finance. Her 1995 book OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995) is one of the most path-breaking and influential corporate
governance monographs of recent times, particularly in its sophisticated economic rationalization of
the role of key nonshareholder constituencies within corporate governance. BLAIR, supra note 14.
Lynn Stout is a Distinguished Professor of Corporate & Business Law at Cornell Law School and one
of the world’s most influential and renowned authorities on, inter alia, corporate law, corporate
governance, and securities regulation. Her 2012 book THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012)

2017]

A Necessary Social Evil

439

depicts equity investors as voluntarily surrendering any formal legal
entitlement and demanding that directors dutifully serve their private
interests.60 This purportedly frees up corporate boards to balance and
mediate between the conflicting claims of different stakeholders, with a
view to protecting valuable enterprise-specific investments undertaken by
employees and other key corporate constituents in addition to the value of
shareholders’ equity capital.61 Thus, the ultimate aim of corporate
governance (and, correspondingly, corporate law), according to Blair and
Stout, is to encourage the continuing advancement of such specialized
financial and nonfinancial investments in the future, thereby enhancing the
long-term economic output of the corporation’s productive “team” as a
whole.62
Both Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout went on to develop the
fundamental rationality of the team production model in their more recent
individual work. In particular, Blair has further elaborated on the notion
of the corporate legal form as a long-term capital “lock-in” device.63
Meanwhile, Stout has advanced a novel understanding of the corporation
in terms of an intergenerational wealth transfer mechanism (or
metaphorical “time machine”) that enables both: (i) the locking-in of
capital resources from the primary market for the benefit of long-term
production projects, which promise gains only in the distant future;
and—correspondingly—(ii) the immediate realization by present investors
of anticipated future corporate profit streams from such long-term

[hereinafter STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH] is one the most influential and high-profile
corporate law monographs of recent times, particularly in its questioning of the common (and arguably
erroneous) belief that U.S. corporate boards are legally bound to maximize shareholder value as a
direct consequence of their legal fiduciary duties. Blair and Stout’s “team production” thesis, for which
they are (at least jointly) best known, is expounded in their now classic 1999 article, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). As well as being one of the most
downloaded papers on the SSRN research database, this article has also been the subject matter of a
previous Berle Symposium (in 2014). Its profound influence within the corporate law academy today
is thus beyond question.
60. In their landmark 1999 article, Blair and Stout posit that: “[t]he act of forming a
corporation . . . means that no one team member is a ‘principal’ who enjoys a right of control over the
team. . . ., [but rather] once they have formed a corporation and selected a board, the team members
have created a new and separate entity that takes on a life of its own and could, potentially, act against
their interests, leading them to lose what they have invested in the enterprise.” Id. at 277.
61. See id. at 278–81.
62. In this regard, Blair and Stout assert that, “the directors are trustees for the corporation
itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’ competing interests in a fashion
that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays together.” Id. at 280–81.
63. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003).
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initiatives via monetization of their risk-adjusted value on the secondary
capital market.64
Meanwhile, in a separate but related line of work, Stout has
challenged the common assumption that the shareholder primacy norm is
an established proposition of corporate law.65 Stout posits that “[t]here is
no solid legal support for the claim that directors and executives in US
public corporations have an enforceable legal duty to maximize
shareholder wealth,”66 but—contrarily—that, “American corporate
law . . . fiercely protects directors’ power to sacrifice shareholder value in
the pursuit of other corporate goals.”67 In this way, Stout sought to build
not just normative but also positive-doctrinal support for the notion of
depersonalized corporate neutrality that lies at the heart of her
sophisticated PSV conception of the corporation.68
Working along similar theoretical lines to the above authors, Andrew
Schwartz69 recently rationalized the corporate entity’s unique perpetual
existence as a means of enabling it to invest “immortally” in productive
operations spanning a potentially infinite future time period.70 Likewise,
Andrew Keay’s71 elegant Entity Maximization and Sustainability (or
“EMS”) Model of the corporation emphasizes the long-term survival and
value enhancement of the corporate entity itself, rather than the welfare of
its shareholders, as the purportedly central corporate objective.72

64. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015).
65. See generally STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 59; Lynn A. Stout, Why We
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008) [hereinafter Stout, Dodge v.
Ford].
66. STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 59, at 25.
67. Id. at 32.
68. See id. ch. 2; Stout, Dodge v. Ford, supra note 65, at 168–72.
69. Andrew Schwartz is an Associate Professor of Law at Colorado Law School and one of the
most exciting and innovative emerging thinkers in the fields of corporate and securities law,
particularly with respect to the implications of the corporation’s unique legal form.
70. See generally Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
764 (2012); Andrew A. Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 237 (2015).
71. Andrew Keay is a Professor of Corporate and Commercial Law at the University of Leeds
in the United Kingdom. He is one of the most prolific and influential corporate law scholars in the
common law world, particularly in the fields of directors’ duties and corporate governance theory.
72. See generally Andrew Keay, Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation
and Sustainability Model, 71 663 MODERN L. REV. (2008). In a fundamentally similar vein, Daniel
Attenborough has developed a sophisticated normative characterization of the corporation in terms of
his purported Equitable Maximization and Viability (EMV) Principle, which essentially posits that the
legitimate dual objective of corporate controllers should be to “(i) respect, protect, and fulfil the
demonstrable, legitimate interests and expectations of the constituent groups that contribute to the
corporation; and (ii) to facilitate the corporation’s viability so that its future is guaranteed with
sufficiently high probability.” See Daniel Attenborough, Giving Purpose to the Corporate Purpose
Debate: An Equitable Maximisation and Viability Principle, 32 LEGAL STUD. 4, 4 (2012).
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Simon Deakin,73 further expanding on these core and interlocking
themes of organizational neutrality and perpetuity, has conceptualized the
corporation in terms of a “commons”: that is, “a shared resource whose
sustainability depends on the participation of multiple constituencies in its
governance (not just shareholders, but employees, core suppliers and
customers).”74 With regard to the corporation’s key distinguishing
structural qualities, Deakin emphasizes the “permanence”75 of the
autonomous legal entity, the long-term “continuity”76 of its asset base,
and—relatedly—the “insulation”77 of its board from direct shareholder
pressure. Deakin claims that, “[v]iewing one user group as having priority
over the others in the use it can make of common resources and in its
power to hold the managers of the resource to account is not compatible
with the maintenance of the resource over time.”78 Accordingly, and in
terms somewhat reminiscent of the abovementioned team production
model, Deakin asserts that the corporation should be understood as
“subject to a number of multiple, overlapping and potentially conflicting
property type claims on the part of the different constituencies or
stakeholders that provide value to the firm.”79
Arguably, all of the above works varyingly form part of an evolving
PSV thought consensus.80 Despite the specific nuances of each component
theory, some core unifying themes arguably emanate from much of this
body of scholarship. Most significant is the common normative assertion
that the corporation, far from being rightfully subject to shareholders’
determinative control or influence, is contrarily a neutral organization
whose autonomous existence and interests entirely transcend those of its
particular body of shareholders at any given point in time.81 From this it
73. Simon Deakin is a Professor of Law at the University of Cambridge and Director of the
Cambridge Centre for Business Research. He is one of the world’s most eminent and respected legal
and social-scientific scholars, whose work spans multiple subject areas and disciplines but most
pertinently corporate governance, labour law, law and economics, and law and development.
74. See Simon Deakin, The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance
and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 339, 339 (2012). The basic conceptual
notion of a “commons” in the sense referred to by Deakin was first authoritatively developed by
Garrett Hardin in his classical piece, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
75. Deakin, supra note 74, at 353.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 360.
78. Id. at 377–78.
79. Id. at 381.
80. Indeed, the potential emergence of a new thought consensus in this regard has been noted by
Stout, who remarks (albeit somewhat sanguinely, perhaps) that, “among experts, shareholder value
dogma shows signs of being in decline,” such that, “the shareholder primacy paradigm is failing, and
alternative paradigms are rising to take its place.” See STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra
note 59, at 114.
81. In this regard, the fundamental normative slant of the PSV position is conspicuously
reminiscent of the reformist element of Berle and Means’ classical 1932 thesis,

442

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:427

follows the additional common proposition that corporate law not only
should—but generally does—afford overriding constitutional protection
to the autonomy, integrity, and perpetuity of the corporate legal entity
vis-à-vis the private interests and demands of any of its specific
constituents, and not least those of, its current shareholders.
II. THE POST-SHAREHOLDER-VALUE POLICY PARADIGM
Somewhat curiously, and consistent with the underpinning
contractarian rationality of the orthodox shareholder primacy position,
proponents of the PSV paradigm would appear to exhibit a general
preference—both academically and on a policy level—for flexible private
ordering as the principal means of implementing appropriate corporate
governance innovations in practice. In this respect, Mayer’s Firm
Commitment82 thesis stands out as a notable case in point. Indeed,
consistent with his understanding of enhanced firm stakeholder
commitment as something motivated by investors’ own enlightened
self-restraint, Mayer eschews coercive or universalistic regulatory
measures in favor of more nuanced and firm-specific private ordering
practices.83 He emphasizes that because “there is not a universally superior
form of ownership and governance of firms which is suited to all firms at
all times,”84 it follows that, “[t]he balancing of commitments and control
is a delicate activity that will be highly specific to the particular nature and
context of the corporation.”85
Mayer believes that, against this background, “[t]he search for
uniform rules of governance is both pointless and damaging,”86 while
“[r]egulations that impede firms’ choice of their appropriate arrangements
undermine their competitiveness.”87 Interestingly, Mayer attributes the
comparative success of the U.S. corporate financing and governance
system to the “exceptional degree of diversity”88 that it permits,
and—in particular—these authors’ oft-cited (albeit somewhat tentative) prediction that the function of
managing the modern public corporation might evolve into that of “a purely neutral technocracy,”
balancing the respective claims of its various stakeholders without necessarily affording overriding
primacy to any particular constituency’s interests. See ADOLF A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 312–13 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev.
ed. 1968) (1932).
82. MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT, supra note 23.
83. See id. at 187–90.
84. Id. at 189.
85. Id. at 188.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 189. In this regard, Mayer is critical of the strong influence wielded by international
corporate governance codes today, which—he claims—compel excessive uniformity often with
unsuitable practices. See id. at 231.
88. Id. at 230.
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particularly with respect to those public corporations that wish to deviate
from the norms of widely dispersed share ownership and shareholder
primacy.89 Therefore, Mayer advocates that, “policymakers should
examine whether there are features of their laws, regulations, or
conventions that may discourage variety and experimentation.”90
A. The Benefit Corporation Framework
As an example of the sort of institutional diversity in corporate
governance that Mayer would appear to support, the developing benefit
corporation framework is highly pertinent. In essence, the benefit
corporation is a novel, alternative legal form to the standard commercial
corporation, which is now statutorily available in the majority of the
United States.91 Despite its present statutory status, the benefit corporation
actually derives from purely private origins in its original guise as the
Certified B Corporation (or “B Corp”).92 The B Corp is a pioneering
corporate certification product provided by the Pennsylvania-based
nonprofit organization B Lab.93 This facility was initially motivated by a
perceived demand from prospective incorporators for a form of corporate
entity that enables the carrying on of an essentially for-profit business but
with a guiding social objective other than the conventionally understood
one of shareholder wealth maximization.94 Well-known businesses that
have opted for B Corp status over recent years include the online craft

89. Mayer notes how this particular aspect of the U.S. environment is in notable contrast to the
UK, where the institutional features of a widely dispersed system—including an unimpeded market
for corporate control—are much more firmly entrenched via regulation and entrenched capital market
norms. See id.
90. Id. at 254. As a pertinent example in this regard, Mayer cites “impediments to issuing more
than one class of share with different voting rights deriving from corporate law, financial regulation,
or the preferred practices of financial institutions and markets[.]” Id. at 254–55. On the purported
benefits of dual-class voting structures from a PSV perspective, see infra Part II.D.
91. The most conspicuous (although by no means only) example of such is the relevant Delaware
legislation is set out in Subchapter XV of the Delaware General Corporation Law under the heading
“Public Benefit Corporations.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (West 2013).
92. See What are B Corps?, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps
[https://perma.cc/85GK-TTMJ].
93. See About B Lab, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab
[https://perma.cc/BTU9-6WZP].
94. See WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., WHITE PAPER, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE
BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSED THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 5–6 (Jan. 2013),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
7MFM-FPQH] [hereinafter CLARK ET AL., WHITE PAPER].
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bazaar, Etsy,95 Ben & Jerry’s,96 and the socially responsible California
clothing brand Patagonia.97 Moreover, in 2013 the Colorado-based firm,
Rally Software,98 became the first B Corp to undertake a public offering
of its shares99 with Etsy following suit two years later by launching the
largest B Corp IPO to date.100
The B Corp certification was designed for those incorporators who
intend their firms to pursue an ultimate social benefit goal, while—unlike
in the case of a charitable nonprofit organization—still maintaining the
capacity to attract outside finance on commercial terms by promising the
future return of some funds to investors.101 Following the Certified B
Corporation’s initially perceived success as a market accreditation service,
its essential structure has since been enshrined on a formal legislative
footing within thirty-two states (including the District of Columbia) in the
guise of the benefit corporation.102 This implementing group of states
notably includes Delaware, where such entities are formally titled Public
Benefit Corporations.103
In its (commonly adopted) model form, the benefit corporation
framework exhibits three core legal features, which together are expressly
designed to offer “entrepreneurs and investors the option to build, and
invest in, a business that operates with a corporate purpose broader than
maximizing shareholder value and that consciously undertakes a
responsibility to maximize the benefits of its operations for all
stakeholders, not just shareholders.”104 To this end, the first key
distinguishing feature of the benefit corporation (in contrast to a standard
95. About Etsy, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/uk/about/?ref=ftr [https://perma.cc/PE5F-B5EB].
96. About
Us,
BEN
&
JERRY’S,
http://www.benjerry.com/about-us/b-corp
[https://perma.cc/3L7P-7X44]. Ben & Jerry’s is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Anglo–Dutch global
conglomerate Unilever plc.
97. Patagonia’s Mission Statement, PATAGONIA, https://www.patagonia.com/companyinfo.html [https://perma.cc/DGB6-Z26L].
98. In May 2015, Rally Software was acquired by CA Technologies, Inc. See Press Release, CA
Technologies, CA Technologies Agrees to Acquire Rally Software, Accelerates Ability for Businesses
to Build Transformative Applications Quickly (May 27, 2015),
http://www.ca.com/us/
company/newsroom/press-releases/2015/ca-technologies-agrees-to-acquire-rally-software.html.
99. Peri Schweiger & Jackie Marcus, Etsy and the B Corp IPO: Sustainability Meets Wall Street,
TRIPLE PUNDIT (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/04/etsy-and-the-b-corp-iposustainability-meets-wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/6MHA-JYBV].
100. Etsy’s widely-reported April 2015 IPO on Nasdaq valued the firm at $3.38 billion. See id.
101. CLARK, JR. ET AL., supra note 94, at 6.
102. See generally Why Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP.,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/why-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation
[https://perma.cc/
XTH8-CPBY]. On the Benefit Corporation phenomenon generally, see generally CLARK ET AL.,
WHITE PAPER, supra note 94; William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations
Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817 (2012).
103. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (West 2016).
104. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101 cmt. (2016).

2017]

A Necessary Social Evil

445

commercial corporation) is its alternative corporate purpose of “creating
general public benefit.”105 This criterion is expressly defined by the model
legislation as requiring “consideration of all of the effects of the business
on society and the environment.”106 Meanwhile, the Delaware Public
Benefit Corporations legislation adds the further provision that such firms
should be intended to produce “a positive effect (or reduction of negative
effects) on one or more categories of person, entities, communities or
interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders)
including, but not limited to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural,
economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious,
scientific or technological nature.”107
The above global mandate is alongside any further “specific public
benefit purposes”108 that the firm’s incorporators elect to add to its articles
of incorporation including:
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities
with beneficial products or services; (2) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of
jobs in the normal course of business; (3) protecting or restoring the
environment; (4) improving human health; (5) promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a purpose to benefit society or the
environment; and (7) conferring any other particular benefit on
society or the environment.109

Notably, the Delaware legislation contains the additional
specification that such firms should “operate in a responsible and
sustainable manner,”110 and thus “shall be managed in a manner that
balances the stockholder’s pecuniary interests, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or
public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.”111
This alternative corporate purpose is supplemented by the second
and, from a corporate governance standpoint at least, arguably most
significant legal feature of the benefit corporation framework. This is a
corresponding multistakeholder director’s fiduciary duty, which is
expressly designed to broaden the legitimate focus of benefit corporation
boards beyond directors’ conventionally perceived fiduciary responsibility
105. Id. § 201(a).
106. Id. § 102.
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(b).
108. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(b) (2016).
109. Id. § 102.
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a).
111. Id.
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to further the specific interests of shareholders.112 Accordingly, in
determining whether a proposed course of action or inaction is in the best
interests of a particular benefit corporation, the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation provides that its directors should have regard to the likely
consequences thereof not just for shareholders but also for other relevant
stakeholder interests including employees, customers, local communities,
society more generally, and the local and global environment.113
Moreover, as a general default rule the directors of a benefit
corporation are expressly not required to give priority to any particular
social interest or factor, but rather are expected to strike an appropriate
balance between these various considerations according to directors’ own
reasonable assessment of their respective materiality to the firm’s creation
of general (and, where appropriate, specific) public benefit.114 In this
context, the business judgment rule expressly operates to protect any such
exercises of directorial discretion from subsequent shareholder or
stakeholder reproach, subject to the usual proviso that the relevant board
decision has been carried out on a rational, disinterested, and reasonably
informed basis.115
One further key legal feature of the benefit corporation, which
reinforces the above alternative business purpose and supporting director’s
duty, is the requirement to compile and publish an annual (or, in Delaware,
biannual) benefit report.116 This report should contain—inter alia—a
narrative account of the firm’s pursuit and creation of general public
benefit (and, where appropriate, any additionally specified public benefits)
in accordance with the above statutory definition of the term(s), together
with an assessment of the overall social and environmental performance
of the relevant firm as measured against a credible third party standard
provided by an appropriate private verification agency (e.g., B Lab).117
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation requires that a publicly traded
112. Indeed, the Model Benefit Corp. Legislation expressly states that, “[t]his [director’s
multistakeholder duty] section is at the heart of what it means to be a benefit corporation.” MODEL
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301 cmt (2016).
113. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a)(1).
114. Id. § 301(a)(3). In a similar vein, the Delaware legislation provides that, “[t]he board of
directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner
that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected
by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its
certificate of incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a).
115. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(e); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b).
116. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401–02; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b).
117. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a). Under the corresponding Delaware provision,
measurement of corporate social and/or environmental performance against an objective third party
standard is not a mandatory or even default requirement, but rather is subject to affirmative opt-in
under a particular Public Benefit Corporation’s charter or bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 366(c)(3).
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benefit corporation’s annual benefit report contain an annual compliance
statement by the firm’s appointed “benefit director”118 to the effect that, in
the relevant officer’s opinion, the firm has conformed to its general (and,
where appropriate, specific) benefit purpose(s) in all material respects over
the reporting period.119 The benefit director’s annual compliance statement
must further confirm that the benefit corporation’s directors have
complied with their abovementioned stakeholder-interest-balancing duty
and should also detail any incidences of deviation by the firm or its
directors from their statutory responsibilities in the above respects.120
B. Practical Limitations of the Benefit Corporation Framework
In terms of the fundamental rationality of the PSV paradigm
described above, the benefit corporation framework would appear to
represent an attractive policy development. Consistent with the logic of
Mayer’s Firm Commitment121 thesis, such entities arguably constitute an
important self-restraint mechanism, enabling investors to “tie their own
hands” by surrendering ex ante the privileged legal status that they would
otherwise enjoy (at least within an orthodox commercial corporate setting)
as the principal collective beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary
accountability. Instead, benefit corporation boards assume a
broader based responsibility to pursue the creation of overall public benefit
from the firms’ operations in the particular manner that they reasonably
see fit. While it is envisaged that shareholders will frequently derive longterm benefits from a firm’s publicly oriented activities, such benefits will
accrue as an indirect or collateral result of management’s pursuit of the
corporate public benefit purpose, as opposed to being a principal
motivation in themselves.122

118. Under the Model Benefit Corp. Legislation, the board of directors of any Benefit
Corporation that is publicly traded is required to designate one of its members as the firm’s formally
recognized “benefit director,” who is accordingly responsible for preparing its annual compliance
statement. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302. Notably, there is no corresponding requirement
in this regard contained in the Delaware Public Benefit Corporations legislation.
119. Id. §§ 302(c)(1), 401(a)(5).
120. Id. § 302(c)(2)–(3).
121. MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT, supra note 23, at 153–54.
122. Indeed, this particular understanding of a Benefit Corporation’s function has been affirmed
by Doug Becker, founder and CEO of the educational services provider, Laureate, which this year is
expected to become the first ever formally registered Benefit Corporation (as opposed to Certified B
Corp) to undertake a public offering of its shares. See Brad Edmondson, The First Benefit
Corporation IPO Is Coming, and That’s a Big Deal, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2016/02/first-benefit-corporation-ipo-coming-thats-big-deal/#
[https://perma.cc/75ZK-X5FA]. In the firm’s IPO prospectus, Becker explained that, “[w]ith the
benefit of a long-term view, we will balance the needs of stockholders with the needs of students,
employees and communities in which we operate, and we believe that this approach will deliver the
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In line with the basic private ordering rationality of the general PSV
position, the benefit corporation framework is, from an incorporator’s
perspective, a purely voluntary facility, which—in functional
terms—could be said to operate as a state-sanctioned means of
“contracting out” of the shareholder primacy norm on a firm-specific
basis. However, from a social reformist point of view, this strength is at
the same time arguably also the framework’s main weakness, especially
when viewed alongside the substantive radicalism of the benefit
corporation phenomenon in comparison with its orthodox
commercial-corporate counterpart.
Indeed, adoption of the benefit corporation model entails not just the
express override by incorporators of a shareholder-oriented directors’
fiduciary duty (to the extent that it would otherwise exist) in favor of a
neutral and multistakeholder-oriented substitute. More fundamentally, it
involves the outright rejection of a conventional commercial rationality
altogether in favor of a novel, hybrid corporate-value system, whereby
“public benefit creation” comes to displace wealth maximization (or even
wealth creation) in any accepted economistic sense as the firm’s pivotal
operational objective. Accordingly, while the optional benefit corporation
model is likely to be of considerable instrumental value within certain
niche industrial sectors, where the partial pursuit of noncommercial goals
is a widely accepted element of responsible business policy (and should
therefore be welcomed on this basis),123 it is unlikely to be adopted by
many firms beyond this relatively peripheral setting, at least in the absence
of direct regulatory compulsion to do so.124
In any event, even to the extent that the benefit corporation model is
adopted in practice, its capacity to negate (insofar as adopting firms are
concerned) the influence of the shareholder primacy norm within the
public corporations setting is doubtful. As a reformist agenda, the benefit
corporation framework is focused principally on recalibrating the
fiduciary responsibilities of relevant directors towards the service of
predominantly nonshareholder-oriented goals with the associated
corporate purpose and disclosure provisions largely reinforcing this
best results for our investors.” Id. Since October 1, 2015, Laureate has operated as a registered
Delaware Public Benefit Corporation, in addition to its previous status as a Certified B Corp.
123. Indeed, even the White Paper setting out the need and rationale for the Benefit Corporation
would appear to accept the likely extraordinary instances of such entities in the context of the forprofit corporate community as a whole. In this regard, it makes express reference to the “sustainable
business movement, impact investing and social enterprise sectors” as likely user groups for the new
corporate form, citing as specific examples of such “community banks, microfinance institutions,
clean-tech or green businesses [and] social venture funds.” See CLARK ET AL., WHITE PAPER, supra
note 94, at 1, 3–4.
124. On the (limitations of) the case for direct regulatory compulsion of Benefit Corporation
structures and other features of the evolving PSV corporate governance model, see infra Part III.
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central policy objective.125 However, as mentioned above, recent academic
literature has challenged the notion that directors are actually under any
sort of affirmative fiduciary obligation to deferentially serve shareholders’
interests, even in an orthodox for-profit corporate setting.126 This has, in
turn, implicitly called into question the practical value of recalibrating
directors’ fiduciary duties as a meaningful corporate governance reform
measure.127
Of course, irrespective of the precise doctrinal substance of directors’
fiduciary duties, the mere fact that the law is in practice commonly
perceived as imposing on directors an imperative to maximize shareholder
wealth is arguably still significant from a behavioral perspective,
especially when coupled with litigation fears and other pertinent cultural
factors.128 Therefore, on an expressive or educative level, the availability
of an expressly nonshareholder-oriented alternative to the orthodox
for-profit corporate form (in the guise of the benefit corporation) would
appear to have some material functional value.129
Notwithstanding these considerations, the benefit corporation model
is still inherently limited as an effective countermeasure to the influence
of the shareholder primacy norm in public corporations. This is because
directors’ corporate law fiduciary duties—regardless of their actual or
perceived content—are arguably a relatively trivial component of the
overall corporate governance machinery when it comes to determining the
actual working objectives of public corporations in practice. Indeed, it
appears that capital market pressures facing boards of directors and senior
executives, derived from the background threat of displacement following
an outside takeover bid, establish a more continuous and compelling form
of managerial accountability to shareholders than that which is likely to
emanate from directors’ fiduciary duties.130

125. On this, see supra notes 104–120 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
127. Cf. infra note 181.
128. See CLARK ET AL., WHITE PAPER, supra note 94, at 6.
129. On the capacity of law to exert an indirect educative effect by making “statements” as
opposed to determining social behavior directly, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 2021 (1996). On the specific context of corporate directorial
duty cases, see generally William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the
Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom
and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002).
130. See Simon Deakin & Giles Slinger, Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law, and The Theory of
the Firm, 24 J.L. & SOC. 124, 128 (1997) (noting that “[a]dvocates of an active market for corporate
control see it as important partly because of the ineffectiveness of internal corporate control
mechanism”). See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
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C. Broad Judicial Legitimation of Managerial Hostile
Takeover Defenses
Mindful of the inherent limitations of directors’ fiduciary duties as a
behavioral influence, proponents of the PSV position typically also argue
for the broad judicial legitimation of managerial hostile takeover defenses
such as poison pills131 and staggered boards, pointing to recent Delaware
jurisprudence132 as supposed evidence that corporate law is actually
moving in a general antishareholder-primacy direction. For instance,
Mayer supports the use of poison pills and other preclusive takeover
defenses as a means of protecting target corporations from the role of
short-term financial “arbitrageurs”133 (e.g., hedge funds), who purchase a
strategic shareholding in order to effect a transfer of control with a view
to making a short-term profit from the resulting share price appreciation.134
Mayer argues that the hostile takeover “freezes management of the
target firm out of one of the most important decision they have to
take—whether or not to remain independent or merge with another firm.”
As such, a hostile takeover is fundamentally averse to the firm’s capacity
to operate as a commitment device.135 From this perspective, he applauds
the Delaware Chancery Court’s Airgas136 decision in 2010137 where a
public corporation board’s dual adoption of a poison pill and staggered
board was regarded as a proportionate response (for purposes of the
Delaware Unocal test138) to the threat of short-term arbitrageurs accepting
a so-called “low-ball” bid. Accepting such a bid would significantly
undervalue the long-term business prospects of the target firm.139

131. The term “poison pill” is colloquial shorthand for a so-called “shareholder rights plan,”
which essentially entails the vesting in shareholders of a contingent right (established under the
corporate charter or bylaws, or by way of independent contract) to purchase a corporation’s voting
stock at a heavily discounted price upon the occurrence of a specified control-related event (e.g., any
shareholder reaching a 15% or 20% ownership threshold). The intended effect is to threaten the
significant dilution of a prospective control-acquirer’s holding, effectively forestalling execution of
any intended bid. It necessarily follows that, in order to be capable of fulfilling its intended function
in this regard, the contingent right granted under the plan to purchase discounted new stock must be
denied to the particular shareholder reaching the applicable voting control threshold, otherwise the
plan’s frustrative effect would be negated. A curious feature of poison pills is that they are never
intended to be used directly, such that their power resides purely in their passive threat value. For this
reason, they are appropriately described as a “shark-repellent” form of managerial antitakeover
mechanism.
132. See, e.g., Air Prod. & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
133. MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT, supra note 23, at 109.
134. Id. at 107–11.
135. Id. at 112.
136. See generally Airgas, 16 A.3d 48.
137. MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT, supra note 23, at 109–10.
138. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–57 (Del. 1985).
139. See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 103–29.
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However, in terms of contemporary corporate governance practice,
it would appear that—at least in the case of larger U.S. listed
corporations—the dominant direction of travel in recent years, with
respect to control-related issues, has been towards enhanced shareholder
power. In particular, an increasing number of firms have succumbed to
concerted pressure from investors and proxy advisors to remove
antitakeover mechanisms.140 Furthermore, as Chancellor Chandler
emphasized in Airgas, contrary to popular wisdom, the dual existence of a
poison pill and staggered board does not in itself render a corporation
“takeover-proof,” given the outstanding possibility of a hostile bidder
acquiring effective control via the alternative (albeit costly and difficult)
avenue of two successive proxy contests if necessary.141 Against this
background, poison pills and staggered boards can contrarily be said to
fulfill their legitimate (shareholder-oriented) purpose of providing a target
corporation’s board with additional leverage to extract an enhanced tender
offer price for shareholders as a precondition to management’s future
cooperation with the bidder.142
D. Enhanced Use of Dual-Class Voting Structures
From a corporate controller’s perspective, it would appear that the
only truly comprehensive way of “locking up” the firm and its internal
capital base from unwanted outside overtures is by preventing the
dissipation of voting control amongst outside investors entirely,
precluding even the residual threat to incumbent management of ouster by
way of proxy contest. To this end, some commentators (admittedly
including the present author143) have exhibited support for the enhanced
use of dual-class voting structures in public corporations, as an effective
means of consolidating corporate voting control in the hands of founding
entrepreneurs, families, or other committed long-term investors.144
140. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1007–09 (2010).
141. See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 115.
142. In this regard, it has been said that, “[t]he length at which Chancellor Chandler’s decision
[in Airgas] focused on whether the Airgas board had a reasonable basis to conclude that the
corporation’s stand-alone value would generate returns over time for stockholders that would justify
rejecting the premium on the table . . . demonstrates that he considered the board’s sole end to be
stockholder welfare[,]” there being “not a hint or suggestion in the case that the directors should
consider other constituencies.” Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a
Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law 22 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Inst. of Law & Econ., Research Paper No.
15-08, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576389.
143. See Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 437–44.
144. See, e.g., MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT, supra note 23, at 106–07; STOUT, SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH, supra note 59, at 110; Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its
Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1182–84 (2013).
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Accordingly, voting shares can be allocated exclusively or, at least on a
discriminatory multiple-vote basis, to “inside” (i.e., illiquid non-trading)
investors who will consequently enjoy either sole or disproportionate
governance influence.145 Meanwhile, “outside” (i.e., trading) investors can
acquire shares with either no or reduced voting rights on a discounted
basis, thereby gaining the benefits of liquidity and cash flow rights but
without the additional attribute of control.146 In this way, control and
commitment can effectively be aligned within the firm in the manner that
Mayer’s Firm Commitment thesis envisages.147
Dual-class voting structures have always been permissible for
NASDAQ listed firms,148 and NYSE listing rules have since 1986
expressly permitted public corporations to issue dual-class common stock
under specific circumstances,149 in recognition of the potential practical
benefits of these structures in enhancing issuing firms’ financing and
governance flexibility.150 In turn, a number of high-profile businesses
including Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Ford, CBS, Viacom, News
Corporation, and Berkshire Hathaway have opted to avail themselves of
varying forms of a two-tier voting structure in recent years, in order to
provide continuing insulation to controlling “inside” shareholders against
potentially destabilizing “outside” investor pressures.151 However, in spite
of their apparently growing popularity, such arrangements remain the
exception rather than the norm within the U.S. public corporation

145. Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 440.
146. Id.
147. See MAYER, supra note 23, at 209. Contrary to the common concern that such structures
entail the unequal treatment of shareholders, Mayer argues that, in fact, “equal treatment of
shareholdings is discriminatory between shareholders because those who hold shares for long periods
are fundamentally different from those who do not.” Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
148. See Tian Wen, You Can’t Sell Your Firm and Own it Too: Disallowing Dual-Class Stock
Companies From Listing on the Securities Exchanges, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1496, 1496 (2014).
149. Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share,
One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 692–93 (1986).
150. In particular, § 313.00(B) of the NYSE Listed Company Manual specifies that “[t]he
Exchange’s voting rights policy permits the listing of the voting common stock of a company which
also has outstanding non-voting common stock as well as the listing of non-voting common stock,”
on the preconditions that: (i) “[a]ny class of non-voting common stock that is listed on the Exchange
must meet all original listing standards”; (ii) “[t]he rights of the holders of the non-voting common
stock should, except for voting rights, be substantially the same as those of the holders of the
company’s voting common stock”; and (iii) “holders of any listed non-voting common stock must
receive all communications, including proxy material, sent generally to the holders of the voting
securities.”
151. Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 443; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Shareholder
Vote With their Dollars to Have Less of a Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1iDv2e0.
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community152 and are likely to remain so for as long as their adoption
remains purely optional on the part of issuing firms.153
Moreover, besides the rare possibility of some form of dual-class
voting structure being adopted (at least partially) by an existing issuer “in
midstream”154 via a reconstructive secondary offering, it is likely that their
adoption will be restricted almost exclusively to newly issuing firms under
continuing entrepreneurial or family control.155 Therefore, while such
mechanisms are a crucial component of the general PSV corporate
governance agenda, they are—at least as things presently stand—unlikely
to attain a sufficiently strong foothold within established capital market
practice to displace the orthodox “one share/one vote” norm in this regard.
For the above reasons, it would thus appear that the United States’
orthodox, shareholder-oriented corporate governance paradigm looks
likely to withstand the current wave of challenges to its hegemony, at least
insofar as the principal alternative legal structures remain premised on a
purely voluntary and quasi-contractual footing.
III. SHOULD THE PSV CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL BE PUT ON A
FIRMER REGULATORY FOOTING?
A. The “Market Failure” Rationale for Mandatory Regulatory
Imposition of PSV Corporate Governance Principles
Notwithstanding the unlikelihood of PSV corporate governance
principles becoming mainstream norms (at least within the foreseeable
future) as a result of micro-level private ordering practices, there may,
nonetheless, be cause to consider the more assertive public-regulatory
implementation of these mechanisms. In particular, if the common
incapacity of entrepreneurs and investors to recognize the purported
152. It has been recorded that, in 2015, approximately 14% of US-listed corporations had some
form of dual-class share voting structure in place. While this is by all accounts a materially significant
figure (especially when compared to the corresponding 2005 figure of just 1%), it
is—in itself—insufficient to infer the onset of any sort of wholesale shift away from the orthodox one
share/one vote policy paradigm. See Solomon, supra note 151 (based on data collated by Dealogic).
153. This is particularly so in light of the recent vocal opposition to dual-class voting structures
advanced by some high-profile and influential U.S. capital market actors, including the Council of
Institutional Investors and the pension fund CalPERS. See Solomon, supra note 151; Council of
Institutional Investors, Dual-Class Stock, http://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock; Ross Kerber, US
Investor Group Urges Halt to Dual-Class Structures in IPOs, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://reut.rs/1UFNKCB.
154. This term—attributable to Professor Lucian Bebchuk—denotes (the extraordinary case of)
constitutional amendments implemented by a firm during its existing life cycle as a publicly listed
corporation, as opposed to (the standard case of) such provision being made at the earlier, initial public
offering stage. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1822 (1989).
155. Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 440.
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economic advantages of the PSV corporate governance platform (at least
relative to the shareholder primacy/equality orthodoxy) represents an
incidence of market failure, then it follows that recourse to firmer methods
of regulatory intervention in this regard is arguably justified in the public
interest.156
On the (presently assumed) dual premise that: (i) the purported
“lock-in” benefits of the PSV corporate governance platform create
long-term economic benefits from which a corporation’s stakeholders
(including its shareholders) as a whole generally stand to benefit; but (ii)
due to a combination of informational limitations and systematic
irrationality, entrepreneurs and/or investors will likely not avail
themselves of the key features of this model in practice; it arguably follows
that the direct regulatory compulsion of those structures is normatively
defensible.157 The “market failure” case for the mandatory regulatory
imposition of PSV corporate governance principles thus rests on a
fundamentally paternalistic basis. That is to say, public policymakers, via
appropriately targeted interventions in private ordering, are arguably
capable of providing what corporate contractors “would have wanted” as
determined by reference to a notionally ideal hypothetical bargaining
scenario.158
While this rationale for the mandatory regulatory imposition of PSV
corporate governance principles may hold a certain intuitive appeal to
those of reformist zeal, it is nonetheless problematic. As is well known,
the principal disadvantage of legally compelling any social-institutional
structure (including a particular corporate governance model) is the fact
that it admits no room for flexibility or deviation from the standard norms,
such that occasional reasonable exceptions cannot be accommodated.159
Indeed, notwithstanding the purported comparative advantages of the PSV
corporate governance model, it is conceivable that in many firms pressing
managerial accountability (i.e., “agency cost”) concerns will still justify
156. On the “market failure” rationale for mandatory corporate law rules generally, see MOORE,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 238–47.
157. See id. at 240. In this regard, Jeffrey Gordon argues that “it is a mistake to assume that full
contractual freedom in corporate law would necessarily lead to private wealth maximization,” but
rather that “[t]he existence of some mandatory rules may lead to better contracts.” Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1554 (1989).
158. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1410–11 (1989); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and
Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 551–52 (1990); Marc T. Moore, Private Ordering and
Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 693, 710–14 (2014); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of
Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1815–16 (1991).
159. On the purported functional benefits of a flexible “enabling” (as opposed to mandatory
regulatory) approach to the design of corporate law rules generally, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 2, ch. 1; MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 18, at 101–06.
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entrepreneurs or investors rationally opting for a traditional
shareholder-oriented governance framework, notwithstanding the
concomitant loss of long-term capital commitment that this arrangement
potentially entails.160 Largely for this reason, regulatory implementation
of any particular feature(s) of the PSV corporate governance model on a
mandatory basis (whether at a federal, state, or stock exchange level) is
most likely inadvisable, notwithstanding the purported substantive merits
of the relevant model itself.161
B. The (Neglected) Social-Distributive Dimension of
Corporate Equity Markets
Additionally, there is a more general cause for concern about the
growing appetite for alternatives to the traditional shareholder-oriented
corporate governance paradigm, which should provide further grounds for
caution when it comes to evaluating the merits of any future regulatory
initiatives in this direction. While critics of the shareholder primacy
orthodoxy are entirely justified in highlighting the various respects in
which excessive shareholder influence can be potentially detrimental to
long-term industrial planning and capital formation, this presents only one
part of the overall picture.
Indeed, a common limitation of the abovementioned critiques of the
shareholder-oriented corporation is its tendency to focus exclusively on
the productive side of corporate capital markets: that is to say, in terms of
what investors—via the medium of capital (and especially equity)
markets—contribute to business corporations in terms of prospective
productive resources. However, arguably, at least as important from a
social perspective is the converse distributive side of corporate capital
markets; in other words, what business corporations (via capital markets)
contribute to investors in the form of actual or anticipated private income
streams.162 From this alternative perspective, the principal social utility of
capital markets inheres in its capacity to enable the private (i.e.,
non-state-administered) generation and distribution of non-occupational
income streams to citizens (especially private pension holders) via returns
160. Indeed, Mayer himself effectively makes this very point, stating that “[t]he success of the
corporation depends on its ability to balance its powers of commitment and control,” such that “[i]n
some cases a high degree of commitment to many parties is required; [whereas] in others, being able
to exercise external control with no commitments is essential.” See MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT,
supra note 23, at 230, 234.
161. On Mayer’s general preference for flexible/enabling as opposed to mandatory/regulatory
methods for implementing effective firm commitment mechanisms in practice, see supra notes 82–90
and accompanying text.
162. On this generally, see Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder
Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 911 (2013).
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on direct or indirect corporate securities holdings. Moreover, equity
markets in particular have special relevance in this regard, insofar as no
other type of security is generally capable of yielding a sufficient ongoing
rate of return to meet the current and future income expectations of
pension fund beneficiaries.163
Appreciation of the social-distributive dimension of public equity
markets and the ensuing knock-on effect of these demands on prevailing
corporate governance norms is by no means novel. Indeed, writing as long
ago as 1932 (in the context of a debate about the merits of facilitating
voluntary corporate social responsiveness164), Adolf Berle recognized that
“not less than half of the population of the country”165 at the time was
directly dependent on corporate securities holdings as an essential means
of non-occupational income provision, “to say nothing of indirect
results.”166 Berle ominously warned that “when the fund and income
stream upon which this group rely are irresponsibly dealt with, a large
portion of the group merely devolves on the community; and there is
presented a staggering bill for relief, old age pensions, sickness-aid, and
the like.”167 For this reason, Berle believed that any radical proposal to
replace shareholder primacy with a more socially oriented alternative
corporate governance paradigm necessarily confronts the corresponding
task of “present[ing] a system (none has been presented) of law or
government, or both, by which responsibility for control of national wealth
and income is so apportioned and enforced that the community as a whole,
or at least the great bulk of it, is properly taken care of.”168
Moreover, major demographic shifts—on both a domestic and global
level—in the intervening eight decades since Berle and Dodd’s fabled
exchange have significantly magnified the gravity of the social welfare
163. Id. at 928. Indeed, it has been remarked that “for a growing group of investors, participation
in the stock market can no longer be thought of as a voluntary endeavor for those with discretionary
or extra funds,” but rather “has become a default form of retirement savings, a personally important
task that is crucial to individual and social financial stability.” Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder:
Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the
Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1303 (2012). Tucker notes that a key driving factor in this regard
is the institution of automatic employee enrollment in employer-sponsored 401(k) plans. See Tucker,
supra at 1315.
164. See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008); C.A.
Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the
Twenty-first Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
165. Berle, supra note 164, at 1368.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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concerns that Berle identified back in 1932.169 Globally, it has been
recorded that “[s]ince World War II, life expectancy at birth has risen from
around age forty-five to sixty-five—a greater gain over the past fifty years
than over the previous 5,000”; whereas, “[i]n the developed countries, it
has risen from around age sixty-five to between seventy-five and
eighty.”170 In this regard, a recent United Nations report warns that
“[b]etween 2015 and 2030, the number of people in the world aged 60
years or over is projected to grow by 56%, from 901 million to 1.4 billion,
and by 2050 . . . to more than double its size in 2015, reaching nearly 2.1
billion.”171
Meanwhile, in the specific context of the United States, the portion
of the national population aged sixty or over is anticipated to increase from
a current figure of approximately 66.5 million (as of 2015) to 93 million
by 2030, and to more than 108 million by 2050.172 Given the unlikelihood
of a parallel rise in fertility rates over the same time period, the implication
is that a rapidly aging population173—together with the significant social
welfare challenges that this necessarily entails174—are now considerably
greater concerns for public policymakers than they were in Berle’s
lifetime. As will be explained below, this arguably stands true nowhere
more so than in the overlapping fields of corporate governance and capital
markets.

169. Indeed, it has been estimated that over 92 million Americans, constituting approximately
50%–54% of U.S. households, are indirectly invested in the stock market by way of mutual funds,
with the great majority of such indirect investors doing so for future retirement purposes. See Tucker,
supra note 163, at 1308, 1312–14; Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the
Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 159 (2013).
170. LORNA FOX O’MAHONY, HOME EQUITY AND AGEING OWNERS: BETWEEN RISK AND
REGULATION 5, n.27 (2012) (quoting RICHARD JACKSON, THE GLOBAL RETIREMENT CRISIS: THE
THREAT TO WORLD STABILITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 10 (2002), https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/global_retirement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SA9-85SY].
171. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., WORLD POPULATION AGEING
2015, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/390, at 2 (2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/
population/publications/pdf/ageing/WPA2015_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M93K-WJQ7].
172. Id. at 126.
173. According to the U.N.’s Population Division, “[p]opulation ageing is an inevitable
consequence of the demographic transition [that] began first in Europe and Northern America, where
fertility reductions took place over the past two centuries, contributing to their relatively aged
population age structures today.” Id. at 57.
174. See generally WILLIAM A. JACKSON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POPULATION AGEING
(1998); PAUL WALLACE, AGEQUAKE: RIDING THE DEMOGRAPHIC ROLLERCOASTER SHAKING
BUSINESS, FINANCE AND OUR WORLD (1999); Anthea Tinker, The Social Implications of an Ageing
Population, 123 MECHANISMS AGEING & DEV. 729 (2002).
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C. The Shareholder Primacy Norm as a Socially Essential
Income-Stabilization Mechanism
At the root of the social dilemma to which Berle was alluding is the
basic structure of a private pensions system linked to capital market
returns, and—in particular—the need for some agent willing to play a
macro level risk-underwriting role therein. That is to say, there must be
some public or private constituency prepared to undertake the contingent
cost of absorbing any negative deficit arising between: (i) the aggregate
value of “active” contributions to the pensions system by prospective
future claimants (i.e., current workers); minus (ii) the aggregate value of
current claims against the system by “passive” members (i.e., pensioners).
In a predominantly public (i.e., state-administered) pensions system, any
such deficit will ordinarily be borne (in the last place) by the relevant
national government itself, so that the taxpayer in effect plays the principal
risk-underwriting role.175 In a predominantly private (i.e.,
non-state-administered) pensions system, on the other hand, the main
risk-underwriting role in this regard is typically played by non-state
agents, whether employer firms or—as is increasingly typical
today—individual worker–savers.176
In the so-called “defined benefit” private pensions system that was
prevalent in this country for much of the previous century, any systemic
deficit was customarily borne by employer firms, insofar as beneficiaries’
entitlements were guaranteed at a contractually pre-determined level (e.g.,
as a fixed percentage of the beneficiary’s final pre-retirement salary).177
However, in the “defined contribution” private pensions system that
generally prevails in the United States today, it is instead the general (or
at least middle-class) public as worker–savers who become principal
risk-underwriters in the above sense. This is because the inherent
open-endedness of beneficiaries’ ultimate entitlements from their
respective schemes, which typically include no guaranteed level of
postemployment income, in effect renders worker–savers’ future
income-generating capacity contingent in large part on the continuing
(variable) rates of return on equity investments made on their behalf.178
Against the above background, the practical capacity of non-state
agents—and, in particular, worker–savers—to underwrite the private
175. Gelter, supra note 162, at 965.
176. See id. at 941–44.
177. Id. at 941.
178. Id. at 943. The term “defined contribution society” has been used to refer to the
contemporary environment “where increasingly the average worker saves for retirement by investing
in private securities markets and becoming a shareholder.” See Tucker, supra note 169, at 157. The
term itself is originally attributable to Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114
YALE L.J. 451, 454 (2004).
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pensions system is dependent on the existence of a supportive corporate
governance system, whereby long-term returns on financial (and
especially equity) capital are proximately stabilized.179 Somewhat
paradoxically, this in turn necessitates an underpinning legal framework
whereby the collective interests of shareholders are systematically given
precedence over the countervailing interests of other stakeholders (and
especially employees) in the event of conflict, particularly with respect to
decisions concerning the ongoing allocation of residual corporate earnings
or cash flows.180 It follows that the legally underpinned principle of
shareholder primacy—in the limited yet meaningful form in which it exists
within orthodox corporate law today181—remains functionally necessary
179. On the general collective preference of institutional investors and analysts for ongoing
stability and predictability in investee firms’ periodic earnings profiles, along with corresponding
managerial strategies for “managing” corporate earnings according to the market’s expectations in this
regard, see Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the
Earnings Game, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 41, 42 (2002); David Millon, Why is Corporate
Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 890, 897–900 (2002); Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 423–32.
180. Indeed, it is commonly acknowledged that dividends and stock buybacks—which were used
strategically by management—constitute important earnings management practices geared to
stabilizing perceived levels of shareholder return. In this regard, the market’s typical primary demand
of an investee firm is that it generates a consistently positive rate of periodic earnings-per-share (or
“EPS”) growth, preferably coupled with a correspondingly steady rise in its declared rate of dividend.
From the viewpoint of investors, steady EPS and dividend growth are desirable corporate attributes
for two main reasons. First, continuing dual EPS and dividend growth ensures ongoing increases in
total shareholder return, whether in realized (that is, dividend) or realizable (consequent stock price
appreciation) form. And, second, the same qualities are (on a superficial level at least) indicative of
management’s capacity to forestall potential turbulence in the firm’s trading environment, and thus
are implicit signals of corporate stability and reliability. Meanwhile, stock buybacks enable
management to artificially enhance a corporation’s periodic EPS from time to time, thereby further
facilitating the abovementioned income stabilization process. In particular, strategic stock buybacks
have the intended effect of reducing the denominator (that is, number of shares) of the firm’s
earnings-per-share ratio, so that each share is notionally representative of a greater proportion of total
shareholder wealth created over the relevant time period. At the same time, stock buybacks enable
management to directly increase the periodic level of total shareholder return via direct distribution of
the corporation’s free cash flow, but without bringing about a corresponding rise in its current rate of
dividend. Consequently, management is able to avoid enhancing general market expectations as to the
trajectory of future annual dividend rate increases. The earnings management function of strategic
stock buybacks can be especially valuable for a firm’s management in the absence of manifest
evidence of significant activity or progress on a business-operational level, insofar as it forestalls
potential market concerns about apparent wastage of the corporation’s unused free cash flow. See
JOHN F. WESTON ET AL., TAKEOVERS, RESTRUCTURING, & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 537 (3d ed.
2001); Michel Aglietta, Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance: Some Tricky Questions, 29
ECON. & SOC’Y 146, 151 (2000); Joel F. Houston et al., To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and
Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance, 27 CONTEMP. ACC. RES. 143, 144 (2010);
Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 428–29.
181. Granted, it is indeed—to quote Lynn Stout—a “myth” to assert that corporate law imposes
any direct or express duty on directors to maximize shareholder wealth as such. See STOUT,
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 59, at 25. However, to infer from this the broader
proposition that corporate law thus affords no lexical priority to the interests of shareholders over other
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for ensuring that, in the last place, directors’ (and, indirectly, managers’)
continuing right to hold office is formally contingent on shareholders’
exclusive (revocable) license.182
From a distributive or supply-side perspective, one of the key
implications of the shareholder primacy norm—as understood in the above
sense—is that it consequently pressures management to ensure that any
product market or other environmental “shocks” to the firm’s business are
borne as much as possible by non-shareholder constituents, and especially
by labor. This in turn facilitates the proximate stabilization of income
streams accruing to worker–savers in their quasi-shareholder capacity as
private pension fund beneficiaries, thereby making it possible for
worker–savers to undertake a collective risk-underwriting function with
respect to the significant private (i.e., non-state-supported) component of

stakeholders is equally fallacious. As Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has recently
stressed, contrary to popular academic assertion shareholder primacy remains a pivotal principle of
Delaware jurisprudence on corporate law, particularly in the realm of directors’ fiduciary duties. See
Strine, supra note 142, at 17–18. Accordingly, while “[t]he fiduciary duty to manage a corporate
enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals,” such that
directors are expressly “not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a shortterm shareholder profit” (per Horsey, J., in Paramount Commc’ns., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1154 (Del. 1989)); this does not displace shareholder wealth as the ultimate fiduciary litmus test for
determining the propriety of directors’ discretionary decisions on business policy. Rather, as Chief
Justice Strine emphasizes, both classical and recent case law clearly establishes that “if a fiduciary
admits that he is treating an interest other than stockholder wealth as an end in itself, rather than an
instrument to stockholder wealth, he is committing a breach of fiduciary duty.” See Strine, id. at 20.
This fundamental tenet of Delaware corporate law was most recently reaffirmed in the 2010 case of
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010), where Chancellor Chandler
emphasized that “[t]he [orthodox] corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for purely
philanthropic ends” and consequently that “I cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that
specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.” 16 A.3d at 34. The same essential point is put
succinctly by Professor Stephen Bainbridge, who posits that “despite occasional academic arguments
to the contrary, the shareholder wealth maximization norm expounded by these courts indisputably is
the law in the United States.” See BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2,
at 53. The author is further grateful to Dr. Robert Austin for illuminating recent discussions in relation
to this issue, and in particular for sharing his excellent (currently unpublished) paper, Do the Directors
of a Business Corporation (Still) Have a Duty to Maximise Shareholder Wealth (2016), which he
presented at the University of Oxford Faculty of Law in May 2016.
182. Specifically, common stockholders’ exclusive collective power of (re)appointment over
directors, as undergirded by their residual fiduciary entitlement described above, in effect activates the
background disciplinary mechanism of the market for corporate control, whose operation is dependent
on the technical possibility of outright managerial displacement via a successful proxy contest. See
BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 55; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
CORPORATE LAW supra note 2, at 67 (explaining that while voter-shareholders in practice “delegate
extensively to managers and almost always endorse their decisions[,] . . . this acquiescence should not
obscure the fact that managers exercise authority at the sufferance of investors”).
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the pension system.183 However, on a macro level, such relative
income-stability for worker–savers in their long-term “saver” identity is
necessarily wrought at the cost of increased income instability in their
immediate “worker” guise; given that the current income-generating
capacity of private sector employees is consequently exposed to the impact
of occasional product market and other environmental shocks to a
correspondingly greater extent.184
D. Shareholder Primacy as the Effective Social “Price” of Sustaining
a Capital-Market-Based Pensions System
In the above way, the shareholder primacy principle constitutes part
of the social contract (or proverbial “Faustian Pact”) to which
worker–savers can be said implicitly to assent in order to sustain a system
of non-occupational income provision outside of direct state control.
Accordingly, the risk-adjusted present value of worker–savers’ human
capital is reduced in order to increase the risk-adjusted present value of
their financial (and especially equity) capital. From this point of view,
shareholder primacy—for all its alleged faults—can ultimately be
regarded as the collective social “price” that citizens (as worker–savers)
pay in order to sustain a pensions system that has the capacity to deliver
levels of social income (largely via returns on institutional equity
holdings), which would almost certainly be economically and politically
infeasible to underwrite via state (i.e., taxpayer) provision alone.
Moreover, recent statistics show that the general public’s relative
dependence on direct or indirect corporate equity holdings as a relative
source of non-occupational wealth gains is increasing yet further today.185
In the United States, this would appear to be especially true for the younger
(under thirty-five) generation, for whom housing wealth in particular has
become a decreasing component of aggregate household wealth over
183. On the economic risk-bearing function of defined contribution pension-beneficiaries, and
consequent importance of macro-level stock market stability to worker–savers’ collective financial
security, see Tucker, supra note 163, at 1315–20.
184. On the purported correlation between: (i) the amount of pension wealth in
(employee-underwritten) defined contribution occupational pension plans, and (ii) the general social
attractiveness of shareholder-oriented corporate governance policies relative to countervailing
labor-oriented measures, see Gelter, supra note 162, at 946–47.
185. 2012 Economic Census data demonstrates that the percentage of aggregate U.S. household
wealth (both occupational and non-occupational) held in the form of shares, mutual funds and/or
stock-market-based savings/retirement plans increased more than five-fold over the past three decades,
from a figure of 9% in 1984 to 46% in 2011; at the same time, the corresponding percentage of total
household wealth held in the form of home equity substantially decreased over the same period, from
41% in 1984 to 25% in 2011. See ALFRED GOTTSCHALCK ET AL., HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN THE U.S.:
2000 TO 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), 2–3, 6, http://www.census.gov/people/
wealth/files/Wealth%20Highlights%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WLK-F2YM].
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recent years.186 This seemingly further enhances the relative social
significance of corporate equity markets as a social wealth-generating
mechanism, together with the corresponding systemic importance of the
shareholder primacy norm in U.S. corporate governance.187
The key normative implication of the above findings is that any truly
meaningful attempt to reform the shareholder primacy orthodoxy in
U.S. corporate governance—for instance, in favor of a more
directly stakeholder-oriented Post-Shareholder-Value paradigm—must
contend with the accompanying need for a comprehensive re-writing of
the latent social contract188 on which the country’s current
186. Between 1984 and 2011, the percentage of aggregate wealth of households with
householders under 35 years of age held in the form of home equity decreased from 46% in 1984 to
21% in 2011. See id. at 3, 6.
187. Of course, it could be said that the aggregate focus of the above figures obscures latent
wealth-distributional factors which call into question the claim that corporate equity-holding in the
United States represents a “democratic” phenomenon in any meaningful sense of the word. In this
regard, Bratton and Wachter have observed that “even as shareholding has diffused downward to lower
income individuals, the shareholders’ overall socioeconomic status has remained largely unchanged,”
such that even today “the shareholder class is not meaningfully middle class and retains elite
characteristics”; in particular, the authors point to the fact that, between 1983 and 2007, the percentage
of all U.S.-listed stock held by the wealthiest 10% of the population decreased only incrementally
from 89% to 81%, demonstrating that “there is nothing inherently democratic or progressive about the
shareholder interest in corporate politics.” See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 490–91, 518 (2013). Drawing on a
comparable (slightly earlier) body of data from both the U.S. and U.K., Ireland has drawn the similar
conclusion that “[a]lthough share ownership has become more widely spread, . . . it remains very
heavily concentrated with the result that shareholder primacy is in reality the primacy of a small
privileged elite.” See Paddy Ireland, Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth, 68 MOD. L.
REV. 49, 49 (2005). While I do not contest the significance of such manifest inequality in conditioning
the general social legitimacy of the shareholder-oriented U.S. corporate governance model, it remains
the case that in absolute (if not relative) social terms, stock-market-based wealth is still a highly
material source of non-occupational income for a sizeable proportion of American households.
Therefore, on a functional or systemic (if not normative or ideological) level at least, its basic socialdistributive utility is arguably undiminished, notwithstanding the undisputable fact that some strands
of the national socio-economic spectrum stand to benefit considerably more than others with respect
to their relative share of the resultant spoils.
188. Of course, irrespective of the continuing social utility of the United States’ capital-marketbased pension system in actual functional terms, it is arguable that the long-term social (and, in turn,
political) sustainability of the shareholder-oriented corporate governance model that undergirds it is
ultimately contingent on the credibility of the continuing public perception that it exists to benefit the
population at large (or at least in substantial part) in some material way, as opposed to just serving a
relatively privileged or “elite” financial-managerial minority. See JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND
PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN THE AGE OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 11
(2010). However, at least as things presently stand, it would appear that the so-called “shareholder
class” remains a sufficiently salient and (at least notionally) representative political interest
grouping—particularly on the center-left of the U.S. political spectrum—to buttress the continuation
of a general public policy agenda (at least at the federal level) geared to preserving the
shareholder-oriented corporate governance paradigm. See Gelter, supra note 162, at 949; William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
69, 81 (2011). Hence the abovementioned “social contract” arguably remains valid today,
notwithstanding growing public and political disquiet over recent years about the perceived unfair
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capital-market-based welfare system is predicated.189 It is submitted that,
absent this necessary broader inquiry into the significant systemic overlaps
between corporate governance and the prevailing national social welfare
framework, reformers should err on the side of caution. Hence, while ad
hoc voluntary adoption of PSV corporate governance structures by
individual firms should by all means be tolerated (and indeed encouraged),
any civil society pressures for more robust regulatory moves in this general
direction should be resisted by public policymakers for the time being.
CONCLUSION
To return to the discussion at the beginning of this Article: despite
various attempts to identify the “true” source of the public corporation’s
institutional uniqueness, it is arguable that the most remarkable of all its
structural features remains largely elided by academic observers. That is
the public corporation’s somewhat peculiar dual identity as both: (i) a
productive, and (ii) a social-distributive mechanism.
Accordingly, public corporations are not only the predominant
organizational vehicle for conducting large-scale industrial production
projects over indefinite time horizons, as academic proponents of the
Post-Shareholder-Value position have vigorously emphasized. Of
comparable importance and ingenuity is the fact that—in the United States
at least—public corporations are also a necessary structural means of
enabling the residual income streams accruing from successful industrial
projects to fund the provision of socially essential financial services, via
the medium of public capital (and especially equity) markets.
Unfortunately, these two dimensions of the public corporation are not
always mutually compatible. Rather, it would seem that more often than
not they are prone to antagonize, rather than complement, one another.
This is especially so when it comes to the periodically vexing managerial
question of whether a firm’s residual earnings should be committed
internally to the sustenance and development of the productive corporate
enterprise itself, or else distributed externally to shareholders in the form
of either enhanced dividends or stock buybacks.190
It is submitted that the evolving PSV corporate governance
paradigm—as manifested on both an intellectual and policy level
today—focuses exclusively on the former of those dimensions at the
distributional consequences of the prevailing corporate governance (and, moreover, general
neo-liberal politico-economic) policy orthodoxy.
189. On the potential public policy alternative of expanding the taxpayer-funded Social Security
system to cover the projected income needs of future retirees, see Paul Krugman, Expanding Social
Security, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1DxeCYn.
190. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.

464

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:427

expense of the latter. Granted, the theoretical insights and practical reform
measures that this movement has generated—and, in particular, the
proliferation of benefit corporations and legitimization of dual-class
voting schemes—deserve commendation as highly beneficial
developments, at least when viewed from this particular (productive)
perspective. For this reason alone, it is submitted that the continuing
voluntary adoption of such structures by individual firms should be both
permitted and—moreover—actively encouraged by relevant laws.
However, encouragement is a very different thing from compulsion, and
it does not follow from the peripheral successes of the PSV movement to
date that the direct regulatory curtailment of any aspect(s) of the orthodox
shareholder-oriented corporate governance framework is consequently
merited. That is, at least without public policymakers being receptive to
the potentially significant indirect social ramifications of any such course
of action.
The somewhat uncomfortable truth for many observers is that, for
better or worse, the American system of shareholder capitalism, and its
pivotal corporate governance principle of shareholder primacy, are
ultimately products of our own collective (albeit unintentional) civic
design. And, until academics and policymakers are capable of
coordinating their respective energies in the direction of somehow
alleviating U.S. worker–savers’ significant dependence on corporate
equity as a source of non-occupational wealth gains,191 they would be well
advised to heed Professor Berle’s warning that “[n]othing is accomplished,
either as a matter of law or of economics, merely by saying that the claim
of this group [i.e., shareholders] ought not to be ‘emphasized.’”192 In the
meanwhile, the shareholder-oriented corporation—despite its many
purported evils—is likely to remain a socially indispensable phenomenon.
To those who rue this prospect, it might be retorted, “better the devil you
know than the devil you don’t.”

191. As Gelter argues, “[s]keptics of shareholder primacy must rethink their agenda and address
U.S. dependence on equity investment. Otherwise, attempts to challenge the dominant model will be
futile.” Gelter, supra note 162, at 970.
192. Berle, supra note 164, at 1368.

